Cryptanalysis of multivariate signatures from a geometric point of view

Can you find a large linear subspace in an algebraic set?

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Context: Post Quantum Cryptography

"Quantum-hard" problems for cryptography

- Finding short vectors in Euclidean lattices.
- Decoding error-correcting codes.
- Computing isogenies between elliptic curves.
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NIST PQC Standardisation: Additional signatures

- Round 1: 11/40 schemes based on polynomial systems
- Round 2: 4/14 (UOV, MAYO, SNOVA, QR-UOV)

Main features: short signatures and fast algorithms.

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Security level ¹		- 111	V
λ	143	207	272

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Applications

SSH, TLS, Software signing, ...

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- Using algorithms such as F4, F5, XL, SAT solvers, ...
- Targeting many families: symmetric, lattices, codes, multivariate, ...

Crash course on polynomial systems

Algebra

The system $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ generates an ideal $I = \langle p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_m(\mathbf{x}) \rangle$ $I := \{\sum_{i=1}^s a_i p_i(\mathbf{x}), (a_i) \in \mathbb{F}_q[\mathbf{x}]^s\}$

$$I = \langle x^2 - y^2 z^2 + z^3 \rangle \in \mathbb{R}[x, y, z]$$

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
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Geometry

This ideal defines a variety

$$V(I) = \{ oldsymbol{x} \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_q^n, orall p \in I, p(oldsymbol{x}) = 0 \}$$



V(I) in \mathbb{R}^3 Image from [Cox, Little, O'Shea]

A key geometric property: dimension

Intuition² of dimension from physics

 $p_1(\mathbf{x}), \ldots, p_m(\mathbf{x}) : m$ "independent" constraints, *n* variables $\implies n - m$ degrees of freedom in V(I).

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
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


Figure 1: A curve has dimension 1

Figure 2: A hypersurface has dimension n-1

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[Kipnis, Patarin, Goubin, 1999]

UOV Public key

Quadratic map $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}): \mathbb{F}_q^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_q^m$ generating $\mathcal{I} = \langle p_1, \dots, p_m \rangle$, with n > 2m.

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[Patarin 1997]

- Quadratic map $\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) : \mathbb{F}_q^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_q^m$ linear in x_1, \ldots, x_o (oil variables).
- Linear change of variables $A \in GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ such that $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{F} \circ A$.

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• First *o* columns of the secret matrix A^{-1} span \mathcal{O} .

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- In UOV, o = m, but not always the case in variants.

Representing UOV keys

UOV keys are quadratic forms

$$\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T F_1 \mathbf{x}, \dots, \mathbf{x}^T F_m \mathbf{x} \qquad \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T P_1 \mathbf{x}, \dots, \mathbf{x}^T P_m \mathbf{x}$$
$$\forall 1 \le i \le m, P_i = A^T F_i A$$



 $F_1 \in (\mathbb{F}_{257})^{n imes n}$

Figure 3: UOV polynomial pair in \mathbb{F}_{257}

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


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• Draw $x_{o+1}, \ldots, x_n \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}_q$.

• Draw
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Forging without the secret key

- Draw $y_{m+1}, \ldots, y_n \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$.
- Solve a quadratic system $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{t}$.
- Return **y**.

 $O(n^{\omega}), \quad 2 \leq \omega < 3$

$$O(q^m)$$

Objective: Find \mathcal{O} , the secret key.

1 What is special about \mathcal{O} , compared to the rest of V(I)?

2 What is special about V(I), compared to other varieties ?

 ${f S}$ Can ${\cal O}$ be hidden with a perturbation or random equations?

4 Can you compress by embedding your key in a field extension?

Tangent space


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$$\operatorname{Jac}_{\mathcal{P}} := \begin{pmatrix} (\overrightarrow{\operatorname{grad}}p_1)^T \\ \vdots \\ (\overrightarrow{\operatorname{grad}}p_m)^T \end{pmatrix}$$
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
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Goal: Distinguish points of $V(I) \setminus \mathcal{O}$ from points of \mathcal{O} .

Geometric observation

A linear subspace is tangent to itself.



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 a basis of $T_x V$, restrict \mathcal{P} to $T_x V$:
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- Compute kernels of BP_iB^T , of large dimension only if $x \in \mathcal{O}$.

Consequence: One vector to rule them all

Main result: more than we bargained for



Given one vector $x \in \mathcal{O}$ and \mathcal{P} , compute a basis of \mathcal{O} in polynomial-time $O(mn^{\omega})$, where $2 \leq \omega \leq 3$ is the exponent of matrix multiplication.

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Time	1.7s	4.4s	5.7s	13.3s

In practice with SageMath on my laptop (2.80GHz, 8GB RAM).

see also: [Aulbach, Campos, Krämer, Samardjiska, Stöttinger 2023]

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Limit: locality of the UOV secret

With this, the points of $V(I) \setminus O$ give **no information** on O.

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
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
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
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


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




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Definition (Singular points)

 $x \in V(\mathcal{I}) \setminus \{0\}$ is singular if $\operatorname{Jac}_{\mathcal{P}}(x)$ has rank less than m.

Algebraic private key

[Kipnis, Patarin, Goubin, 1999]

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Secret Jacobian

The Jacobian of $\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x})$ has a special shape :

$$\mathsf{Jac}_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} J_1 & J_2 \\ 1 \cdots n & n \end{bmatrix}$$

Where $J_1 \in \mathbb{F}_q[x_{o+1}, \ldots, x_n]^{m \times o}$ and $J_2 \in \mathbb{F}_q[x_1, \ldots, x_n]^{m \times n - o}$.

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 $\dim \operatorname{Sing}(V(I)) \geq 2\dim(\mathcal{O}) + m - n - 1$

[Kipnis, Patarin, Goubin, 1999]

Generic smoothness of a singular variety



For a generic UOV variety, $\operatorname{Sing}(V(I)) \subset \mathcal{O}$ (in \mathbb{Q} and $\mathbb{F}_p, p \gg 1$).

In other words, the singular points we have counted are expected to be the only ones.

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Polynomial system solving

Compute singular points by solving a polynomial system using a Gröbner basis: an equivalent polynomial system that is easy to solve, but hard to find.

Gröbner basis of SingV(I)

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field characteristic:	
	253 29, p1, y2, p3, p4, y5, m6, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x6, x6, x10, x11, x13, x14, x15
	33*3+368**3+3*9*313*5+3#8;
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Gröbner basis of SingV(I)

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
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Gröbner basis of SingV(I)



Gröbner basis of SingV(I)

The Gröbner bases we obtain are special: they contain linear polynomials defining \mathcal{O} .



Geometric interpretation when p is too small for genericity

 $\operatorname{Sing}(V(I)) \cap \mathcal{O}$ is the component of highest dimension of $\operatorname{Sing}(V(I))$.

Spoiler: this algorithm is too expensive to threaten UOV.

From quadratic forms to linear algebra

[Kipnis-Shamir 1998]

If n = 2m, then \mathcal{O} is an invariant subspace of $P_i^{-1}P_j$. Poly-time cryptanalysis.

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 $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O}$ is an eigenvector of $P_m^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{m-1} y_i P_i$ with probability $\approx q^{2m-n}$. Exp-time.

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[KS'98] computes singular points of the intersection of two quadrics.[Luyten '23][KPG'99] computes singular points of $V(\mathcal{I})$.Beullens, Castryck '23

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Geometric interpretation of an old attack

[KS'98/KPG'99] are (hybrid) singular point computations. Weaken hypotheses and support heuristic analysis by estimating $|Sing(V(I))|_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ with the Lang-Weil bound.

Objective: Find \mathcal{O} , the secret key.

1 What is special about \mathcal{O} , compared to the rest of V(I)?

2 What is special about V(I), compared to other varieties ?

3 Can \mathcal{O} be hidden with a perturbation or random equations?

4 Can you compress by embedding your key in a field extension?

UOV+

[Faugère, Macario-Rat, Patarin, Perret 2022]

Start with a UOV secret key, replace $t \leq 8$ polynomials by random polynomials, and mix. $\mathcal{P} = S \circ \mathcal{F} \circ A$

Idea: Tradeoff between signing time and key size.

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Analysis: $\mathcal{O} \not\subset V(\mathcal{I}) \implies$ key attacks on UOV $\hat{+}$ must invert \mathcal{S} .


Geometric interpretation

Let $\mathcal{I} = \langle \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}) \rangle$. $V(\mathcal{I})$ is the intersection of a UOV variety with t generic quadrics.

$$V(\mathcal{I}) = \underbrace{V(\mathcal{G})}_{\text{Generic quadrics}} \cap \underbrace{V(\mathcal{J})}_{\text{UOV variety}}$$


Underlying UOV Jacobian

Jacobian of \mathcal{F} when $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{O}$:



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


Observation

The singular locus of $V(\mathcal{I})$ contains $(\operatorname{Sing} V(\mathcal{J})) \cap V(\mathcal{G})$.

Underlying UOV Jacobian

Jacobian of \mathcal{F} when $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{O}$:



Observation

The singular locus of $V(\mathcal{I})$ contains $(\operatorname{Sing} V(\mathcal{J})) \cap V(\mathcal{G})$.

Dimension computation

 $\hat{+}$ reduces the dimension of the singular locus by at most 2t.

From singular points to a key recovery attack

 $V(\mathcal{I})$ is the public key variety, $V(\mathcal{J})$ is the underlying UOV variety.

Singular points (still) leak the trapdoor

 $\operatorname{Sing}(V(\mathcal{I})) \subset \operatorname{Sing}(V(\mathcal{J})) \subset \mathcal{O}$

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Singular points of $V(\mathcal{I})$

 $pprox q^{3o-2t-n-1}$ singular points of $V(\mathcal{I})$, and $\mathcal{P}(m{x})=0$, with q^{o-1} candidates.

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Can we decide " $x \in O$?" faster than $O(q^t n^{\omega})$?

Adapting " $x \in O$?" to UOV $\hat{+}$ efficiently

Previous result for UOV



Decide $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O}$? in polynomial time: $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O} \implies \mathcal{O} \subset T_{\mathbf{x}}V$.



Adapting " $x \in O$?" to UOV $\hat{+}$ efficiently

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[P. 2024]

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Tangent spaces again

 $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O} \implies \mathcal{O} \cap T_{\mathbf{x}} V$ large dimension.



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Restricting to an easier UOV $\hat{+}$ instance

 $\mathcal{P}_{|T_xV}(\mathbf{x})$ is a UOV+ instance with *o* equations but n - o + 1 variables and an o - t dimensional UOV trapdoor.



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 $\mathcal{P}_{|\mathcal{T}_{x}V}(\mathbf{x})$ is a UOV+ instance with *o* equations but n - o + 1 variables and an o - t dimensional UOV trapdoor.

Distinguisher

 $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O} \implies V(\mathcal{P}_{|T_{\mathbf{x}}V}(\mathbf{x}))$ has constant codimension. Solved in polynomial time.





Application: New attack on UOV $\hat{+}/VOX$

$x \in \mathcal{O}$? in polynomial time



Decide $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O}$? in $O(\binom{n-o+2t-3}{4}^2\binom{n-2o+2t+1}{2})$.

3

Application: New attack on UOV $\hat{+}/VOX$

$x \in \mathcal{O}$? in polynomial time

Decide
$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{O}$$
? in $O(\binom{n-o+2t-3}{4}^2\binom{n-2o+2t+1}{2})$.

Singular points attack and asymptotic result

Singular points of $V(\mathcal{J})$ leak the trapdoor without inverting \mathcal{S} :

$$O(\underbrace{q^{n-2o+t}}_{\# \text{ trials}} \cdot \underbrace{\binom{n-2o+2t-3}{4}^2 \binom{n-2o+2t+1}{2}}_{\text{Cost of each trial from } x \in \mathcal{O}?})$$

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Previous result

This attack improves the Kipnis-Shamir attack which required:

$$O(q^{n-2o+2t}n^{\omega})$$

25/31

[Cogliati, Faugère, Fouque, Goubin, Larrieu, Macario-Rat, Minaud, Patarin, 2023]

Practical results and bit complexity

Parameters	I		V
log ₂ gates	39	41	43
Timing on my laptop	1.8s	5.5s	15.4s

Figure 4: $x \in \mathcal{O}$? with msolve on UOV $\hat{+}$.

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log ₂ gates	39	41	43
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Figure 4: $x \in \mathcal{O}$? with molve on UOV $\hat{+}$.

We add $\log_2(q) \times (n - 2o + t)$ to obtain the full cost:

Parameters	I	- 111	V
Security level (log ₂ gates)	143	207	272
Kipnis-Shamir (log ₂ gates)	166	233	313
This work (log ₂ gates)	140	188	243

Figure 5: Full attack on UOV^{+} .

Objective: Find \mathcal{O} , the secret key.

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 ${f S}$ Can ${\cal O}$ be hidden with a perturbation or random equations?

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The Quotient Ring transform

• Generate a UOV (q^{ℓ}, m, n) key with ℓm equations.

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VOX: QR-UOV $\hat{+}$

$$\operatorname{UOV}\hat{+}(q^{\ell},m/\ell,n/\ell,m,t) \xrightarrow{}_{\operatorname{QR}} \operatorname{UOV}\hat{+}(q,m,n,t).$$

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MinRank attacks on the big field instance of VOX

- Initial parameters are not secure
- Practical attack on all new parameters

[Furue, Ikematsu 2023]

The dimension of the public key variety in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{\ell}}$

 ℓm generic quadratic polynomials in *n* variables define a variety of dimension $n - \ell m$.

 $\mathsf{In}\;(\mathsf{QR}\operatorname{-})\mathsf{UOV},\,\mathcal{O}\subset V(\mathcal{I})\implies \mathsf{dim}(V(\mathcal{I}))\geq \mathsf{dim}\,\mathcal{O}\geq m$

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This attack is taken into account in [QRUOV] but not in [VOX].

Practical attack on VOX [VOX@NIST 2023], [VOX minus, Varjabedian 2025]

Dimension computation

 $UOV + (q^{\ell}, m/\ell, n/\ell, m, t)$ defines a **variety that contains** $\mathcal{O} \cap V(\mathcal{G})$ but it should be the empty variety for a generic system.

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Subfield attack

Practical key recovery attack on the big field instance and use of subfields

 $\mathbb{F}_{a^{\ell'}} \subset \mathbb{F}_{a^{\ell}}$ to attack a subset of new parameters.

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Parameters	I	lc		Illa	V	Vb
l	6	9	7	15	8	14
ℓ'	6	3	7	5	8	7
time	0.29s	2 ⁶⁷ gates ⁴	1.35s	56.7s	0.56s	6.11s

Figure 6: Timing for the subfield attack on VOX (2023) on my laptop.

⁴400 CPU-hours on a server in practice.

Thank you for your attention!

One vector to full key recovery in polynomial time

From **one vector** in \mathcal{O} , return a basis of \mathcal{O} in polynomial time.

Singular points of UOV and UOV $\hat{+}$

- V(I) has a large singular locus.
- Singular points of UOV $\hat{+}$ yield faster attacks.
- Key recovery from one vector for UOV $\hat{+}$ in polynomial time.

Future/On-going work

Find efficient algorithms to achieve the Debarre and Manivel bound.

- In the generic case, as a precomputation for solving systems.
- In the UOV case, as key recovery attacks.

Level	q, o, v, t	epk gain vs UOV
I	251, 48, 55, 6	36%
111	1021, 70, 79, 7	44%
V	4093, 96, 107, 8	27%

(5) Open questions and future/on-going work

Let
$$\delta(n, s, r) = (r + 1)(n - r) - s\binom{r+2}{2}$$

The Debarre and Manivel Bound⁵

[Debarre, Manivel 1998]

Let X be a generic complete intersection of m quadrics of rank n.

⁵The original statement is for arbitrary degrees.

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• If $\delta(n, s, r) < 0$, then X contains no (proj.) r-dimensional subspaces

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Application to UOV

If $\alpha = \frac{n}{s}$ is a constant, then a UOV secret is characterized by a constant number of polynomials from the public key.

For practical parameters, 3 or 4 polynomials are enough.

⁵The original statement is for arbitrary degrees.

Two possible directions:

Solving underdetermined polynomial systems

Computing the largest subspace in generic complete intersections.

 \rightarrow improves forgery attacks against UOV.

Original key recovery attacks against UOV

Computing the smallest non-generic subspace in a UOV variety.

Generic application: How to solve underdetermined systems?

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- Does step **a** become more expensive than step **b**?

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- Singular points require $\frac{m}{2} + 1$ polynomials: does not achieve the bound.

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How to choose Π so that it is easy to compute the polar variety when \mathcal{O} is unknown?

 \rightarrow Easy to distinguish UOV from generic systems with polar varieties... when ${\cal O}$ is known.